Understanding Deterrence: How Nations Prevent War in the Modern Nuclear Age

The concept of deterrence is one of the most classic strategic concepts that influence the global security, in particular, during the nuclear age. Fundamentally, deterrence is a behavioral mode in which the one party discourages the other to engage in hostile behavior by compellingly indicating that the pain of doing it will be many times more than the benefit of doing so. The mission of the military power of the nuclear age is not to win wars, it is to avoid them, as it was famously stated by Bernard Brodie. Such a change of mind made an immense change in the doctrine of strategy after the carnage of World War II.

The theoretical basis of deterrence is the classical realism in which the behavior of the state is dictated by fear, power, and rationality. Nevertheless, the deterrence theory achieved its articulation during the cold war. Deterrence was regarded by some scholars like Thomas Schelling, as a kind of bargaining; a certain type of diplomacy by using the threat of force and not the use of force. In this regard, deterrence is based not just on solely physical capacity, but also on the accuracy and articulateness of threats. To make deterrence effective, states need to show the capability and readiness to take revenge and make their red lines clear.

Effective deterrence has three conditions thus, which include capability, credibility, and communication. The term capability can be said to mean the military strength that can be used to retaliate even after receiving a strike that is considered to be survivable; in this case a second-strike nuclear capability is what is involved. Credibility relies on political determination and regular signaling which shows readiness to take action. In the meantime, open communication is a key to make sure that enemies have full idea of the implications of breaking the set limits. Communication or credibility failures have been historically known to result in miscalculation and escalation of crisis.

Deterrence is of different kinds as there are general deterrence which is the one that is implemented at peacetime and immediate deterrence which is the one that is implemented at times of crisis. Deterrence with punishment threatens a retaliatory harm, which is usually so large as to be directed against a city or an industrial center, whereas deterrence with denial aims to persuade an enemy that an attack is simply impossible. These dynamics are further made complicated by the inclusion of extended deterrence as seen in the U.S. defense of NATO allies during the cold war making the security of more than one country interconnected.

Although it is very high, deterrence cannot go without criticism. A central issue of it is the credibility dilemma, would a state genuinely run the risk of a disastrous war, even nuclear obliteration, in the name of its deterrent promises? There are also ethical complexities that are caused by doctrines based on massive retaliation that may attack civilian population. In addition, the deterrence theory presupposes that the decision-making process is rational, and the history proves that leaders are vulnerable to misperception, emotions, and domestic political factors as pointed out by Robert Jervis.

In the post-cold war setting, deterrence has been facing new challenges with the advent of non state actors, including terror groups, which do not have territory and population centers that can be threatened. This has promoted the concept of deterrence based on denial, resilience and intelligence based responses instead of the conventional nuclear deterrence.

South Asia is a squabble of these tensions. Since India and Pakistan declared nuclear power in 1998, nuclear deterrence has helped to prevent big wars and has had the unfortunate effect of facilitating small-level conflicts under the nuclear shadow. Such a scenario is a case of the so-called stability-instability paradox whereby nuclear stability on the strategic level promotes risk-taking on the conventional or sub-conventional level.

Finally, deterrence is not a military relationship but a psychological relationship. It requires mature leadership, responsible policymaking, and effective communication in order to be effective. The concept of deterrence must keep changing as cyber warfare, artificial intelligence and use of non-state actors transform the world order of security, not only on the nuclear front but also in the political, informational and technological arenas.